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ABSTRACT
Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems aim to create a secure framework to control access and
actions that can be performed by users (both human and machine). DRM technologies have become
very important in an increasingly networked world because it promises the owner of the file persistent
control over the file even when the file leaves the owner’s machine. It is not only useful in combating
piracy (which is currently the main use of DRM systems) but also for protecting sensitive documents
in enterprises.
DRM systems can be seen to fit at various levels on a computer system - at an application layer, which
is currently seen in applications like Apple iTunes; at an operating system level like Microsoft’s Rights
Management System (RMS) in Windows Server 2003 or at a hardware level like Content Scramble
System (CSS) in DVD players. However, current DRM systems are mostly not interoperable and in
most cases either do not provide the all requirements expected by the customer or do not provide a
totally secure framework.
DRM systems that are used for copyright enforcement give rise to many legal questions mostly re-
volving on the amount of control the copyright holder has over their creations once they have been
distributed. Many of the legal questions do not affect DRM systems for enterprises, but most of the
technical requirements are the same.
This paper gives a broad overview of the current state of DRM systems and their strengths and weak-
nesses. It starts by examining the legal requirements of the system to satisfy both the right holders
and the end consumers. We then discuss the structure of DRM systems, their characteristics and how
well they satisfy the legal requirements. Finally we review three DRM systems and look at how well
they satisfy the requirements desired in a DRM system.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of the Internet, the speed and ease of digital data exchange has increased, to-
gether with the number of potential parties that can exchange data. This has also meant that digital
data security is no longer confined to the computer that holds the original data, or even behind cor-
porate firewalls. Furthermore, data security no longer applies only to the access to data, but also to
what the user can do with the data [4]. Encryption is no longer enough, for a user can easily willingly
or unwillingly pass on the unencrypted data to unauthorised users. Thus, there is a growing need for
data to not only have access control mechanisms but also to define mechanisms to control the actions
of how users use the data.
There are no widely accepted definitions for Digital Rights Management (DRM). Rosenblatt et al. [24]
provide two definitions for DRM. In the narrower definition, DRM focuses on persistent protection
of digital data. This definition refers to technology that protects digital content via encryption and
the access control mechanisms that allow a user to view the digital content. In the broader definition,
DRM is everything that can be done to define, manage, and track rights to digital content [24]. Under
this definition, DRM technology also includes technology that manages and tracks digital content on
the Internet. DRM is also known by other names, such as Content Management Systems (CMS) [8],
Enterprise Right Management Systems (ERMS) [4] etc.
With the rise of music and movie piracy on the Internet, DRM systems have taken the spotlight in the
media industry’s fight against Internet piracy. However, multimedia is not the only use of DRM sys-
tems, and the same techniques can be used to protect documents in enterprises. The main difference
lies in the legal framework in which a DRM system is implemented, since the users of media products
are customers while in enterprises it is usually meant for employees.
This paper takes a broad overview on:
1. Legal issues regarding DRM systems
2. Distribution architectures of DRM systems
3. How DRM systems work
4. Rights Expression Languages (REL) and XrML
5. Some of the current DRM products and their effectiveness
2 LEGAL BACKGROUND
DRM technologies aim to enforce the legal rights of the owners of the digital media; and thus a
discussion on the legal background is necessary to understand some of the problems with current
DRM systems. In this discussion, work will be used to refer to the digital data that is meant to be
protected using DRM.
2.1 The Players in a DRM System
Bartolini et al. [8] mapped out a set of requirements for content management systems to a set of
players. Each of these players have different roles within a DRM system and as such, each of these
roles have different legal specifications. The roles described by Bartolini et al. were:
1. The author or the creator responsible for creating the work. The author does not necessarily
have to be human.
2. The right holder (or copyright owner) of the work. The author is not necessarily the copyright
holder and usually the right holder is also referred to as the owner of the work.
3. The service producer is the entity that is responsible for the implementation of DRM on the
work.
4. The media distributor is the entity that is responsible for distributing the work and usually
collecting revenue from the users. In many cases, the media distributor is also the service
producer (e.g. Apple iTunes music store).
5. IPR register / database is a server that maps the rights associated with the work to the user. It is
also referred to as the license server [23].
6. Unique Number Issuer is responsible for issuing a unique identifier to each creation.
7. The controller is a Trusted Third Party (TTP) that is responsible for ensuring that all the trans-
actions have been carried out legally.
8. The certificate authority is another TTP that is responsible for authenticating all parties in the
DRM transaction
However Bartolini et al. does not take into consideration the end user of the work as a player. A DRM
enforced work is essentially subject to a contract between the user and the right holder [9] and thus,
requires the user to be involved in the transaction. This is further complicated by rights that the user
can expect to have in the contract [21].
Figure 1: Players in a DRM System
Currently, most DRM systems do not employ any TTPs [23, 21]. The license server is usually de-
ployed by the distributors and identifiers to digital works are managed by the respective distributors.
Thus, a DRM transaction currently involves only the end user and the distributor. Figure 1 proposes
a DRM system with all the players considered by Bartolini et al. as well as the end users. The trans-
actions between the end users (the consumers of the work) and the producers of the work should also
involve a controller to monitor the transactions for correctness and legality. A certificate authority
should also be involved to authenticate the users.
2.2 Legal Perspective: The Owner
Both DRM technologies and new legislations in the U.S. and Europe are aiming to help owners to re-
ceive their dues [17]. Currently, the majority of DRM systems focus on multimedia, especially music
and movies, and the owners (in this case the record and movie companies like AOL Time Warner)
would like to use DRM enabled media to combat Internet piracy.
By their very nature, digital works are very easy to replicate. With Peer-to-Peer (p2p) networks and
the availability of high speed Internet connections, digital works are also very easy to distribute.
This makes it very easy to illegally copy digital works and distribute them, thus udercutting the right
holders. The media industry would like to use DRM to enforce copyright on their works and thus
receive payment when the user listens to a song, reads a book or watches a movie.
2.3 Legal Perspective: The User
Many end users are very hostile to DRM protected media [3, 5]. Many of their concerns are legitimate
and this section looks at some of those concerns, namely fair use, privacy and right holder control. For
DRM to be successful in the market place, DRM vendors must address these issues first. However,
it must be noted that the concepts of fair use and right holder control only apply in a case where the
user purchases or rents a digital work protected by DRM. In the enterprise, the large majority of the
fair use and right holder control issues are non-existent.
2.3.1 Fair Use
In the famous Sony-Betamax or Universal City Studios v. Sony Corporation of America, 446 U.S. 417
case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Sony could not be held liable for illegal copying of copyright
works made using their Sony-Betamax video recorder [11]. The case also highlighted the idea of
fair use1, some of which is regulated in many countries’ copyright laws (e.g. Section 107 in U.S.
Copyright Act) [21].
Fair use (also referred to as personal use), usually allows for the reproduction of a copyrighted work
for a variety of reasons [21, 27, 1]. Sections 12–19 of South Africa’s Copyright Act 98 of 1978 gives
the exceptions to copyright which allow users to reproduce (in any form) and excerpt copyrighted
works for certain purposes like research or private study, reporting in the media, reviews and criti-
cism, teaching and for backup purposes. There are also cases where there is no current legislation on
how copyright regulates the use of a work [21]. These unregulated uses include how often, where and
when a copyrighted work is used, who uses the copyrighted work or the ability to transfer the owner-
ship of the copyrighted work to another party. Some of these uses are currently regulated by license
agreements (esp. on software), but there are usually no mechanisms to enforce these regulations.
There are fears that DRM will allow media companies to protect copyright in the form of license
agreements that prevent fair uses [14]. In [14], Dusollier counters that fair use clauses in the European
Copyright Directive of 2001 is a legislative way of countering such moves, although the legislation
itself does not address all cases of fair use.
Felten argues that the concept of fair use is too broad and not defined well enough to be ever im-
plemented correctly [16]. Fair use is often based on the circumstances of use, thus the fair use of
1The concept of fair use itself is not new – it was initially proposed in the early 1800’s to allow book buyers leeway in
how they used books. Fair use allowances has changed over the years to cater for newer technologies
a copyrighted work will depend on each individual user. Furthermore, implementing fair use will
require highly sophisticated AI, and many of the fair use tests are already hard AI problems. Felten
believes that these factors make it very difficult for DRM systems to implement fair use.
On the other hand, Bechtold [9] argues that at least DRM vendors should allow for the possibility
of enabling fair use. Many of the current DRM products do not allow for fair use [21] even though
current right expression languages have the capability to express most of the requirements on an
individual basis [9].
2.3.2 Privacy
DRM systems have often been accused of violating user privacy [21] and next to fair use, end user
privacy violation (or the potential to) is seen as one of the major problems with many DRM sys-
tems [21, 13, 25]. The ability of DRM systems to track the usage of DRM protected media is seen
as one of the major violations of privacy. However, Bartolini et al. [8] and Park et al. [22] all put the
ability of DRM to track usage as one of the most important in meeting all the objectives. The problem
with tracking user usage boils down to how much monitoring is done. In the past, user tracking has
been used to look at browsing habits [21] and tracking can be potentially used to track habits of users
even when they are not using DRM enabled works.
2.3.3 Right Holder Control
Right holder control is essentially how much the DRM enabled work determines what the user does
with the work. In an enterprise scenario, right holder control could be absolutely critical – the en-
terprise would like to define exactly the boundaries for using the DRM protected work. Consumers
however, would like as little control as possible on DRM protected works [21]. This is shown espe-
cially with the popularity of Apple iTunes Music Store compared to other music offerings, with the
Apple iTunes offering DRM enabled works with the least control and out-selling virtually all other
offerings combined. Section 4 takes a more detailed look at the DRM systems used in current music
stores.
2.4 Legal Perspective: The Distributer
The distributor is responsible for providing DRM enabled data to the user and at the same time allow
the right holders mechanisms to track the illegal use of the data [8]. In many current media distribu-
tions, the distributor also plays the role of the license server.
From the user’s perspective, the distributor needs to keep user data confidential and not reveal the
data to third parties. Whether the right holders are a third party, however, will usually depend on
the license agreements with the end user. Most of the legal concerns of the user (like privacy) are
controlled by the distributor and thus it falls on the distributors to solve them.
From the right holders perspective, the distributor must be able to distribute data without compromis-
ing the security of the data. If a security compromise does take place, then the distributor must be
able to track down the offender [8]. Others have suggested that pirated DRM data must at least be
identifiable [12, 26].
2.5 Legal Requirements
For DRM to be effective, the legal concerns of the users and the right holders need to be taken into
account. It is very likely that all the fair uses that are expected by users cannot be accounted for in an
automatic system and there might be a need for a user to ”apply” to a license server/distributor for a
fair use to be enabled (e.g. a magazine writer asking for the right to excerpt from a document). Such
a system will however require a third party to authenticate and accredit the users (e.g. the user is a
accredited journalist), which is not used in the current implementations of DRM systems. Because
DRM has the capability of imposing very tight right holder control, legislation might be required to
counteract such a move.
In summary, users would like a DRM system that:
1. can handle most fair use scenarios
2. keeps data collected from users confidential and does not monitor the usage of DRM data2
3. allows for the transfer of rights, and
4. is flexible depending on the media/situation
while right holders would like DRM systems that:
1. can keep track of illegal use of DRM enabled media
2. can correctly collect revenue from the usage of their works
3. can create a secure distribution channel, and
4. prevents the illegal use of their works
3 STRUCTURE OF DRM SYSTEMS
In 1999, Bartolini et al. [8] looked at the requirements and the players involved in a possible DRM
system. In 2000, Park et al. [22] looked at all the different possible distribution architectures that
could be implemented for securing content distribution. This section looks at the different distribution
architectures, how all the players fit together to access a DRM enabled work, the types of DRM
controllers and gives an overview of right expression languages.
3.1 Distribution Taxonomy
Park et al. gave three factors that distinguish the different security architectures involved in distribut-
ing secure content: the presence of a virtual machine (VM), the type control sets and the distribution
style. Figure 2 shows the different distribution architectures with the notation used by Park et al. to
distinguish between them.
3.1.1 Presence of a virtual machine
The first level of distinction is the presence of a virtual machine (VM). The VM is described by Park et
al. as “software that runs on top of vulnerable computing environment and employs control functions
to provide the means to protect and manage access and usage of digital information” [22]. A VM can
be in the form of a plugin that controls access to DRM enabled data or embedded in the application
itself. Systems that do not have a VM cannot manage and control access and usage of secure data that
the recipient receives, making it unsuitable for use as a DRM solution.
2Monitoring of usage will depend on the usage of the data. An enterprise will probably not be willing to take the
risk of an employee leaking secrets and thus will monitor all uses of data. Entertainment companies however have not
monitored how the content is used by a consumer; and thus the consumers would expect such in DRM enabled media.
Figure 2: DRM Distribution Architectures [22]
3.1.2 Types of control sets
The second level of distinction is in the type of control set used. Control sets are the rules governing
the use of a DRM enabled work, and this has given rise to Right Expression Languages (REL) that
allow for the description and specification of the control sets. Park et al. categorised control sets into
three types: fixed control sets, embedded control sets and external control sets [22].
In fixed control sets, the virtual machine comes with a predefined control set which is enforced for
all DRM enabled data. Fixed control sets are easy to implement, but offer very little flexibility. The
encryption system for DVDs (DVD-CSS) is a good example of a fixed control set mechanism and the
possible problems with such a mechanism. The DVD-CSS algorithm was flawed and was compro-
mised within a few months of availability of DVD systems. Because of the wide installation base,
and the fact that DVD systems could not undergo firmware upgrades, DVD encryption system was as
good as not being present at all [21, 9]. While fixed control sets are not suitable for general application
in DRM systems, they have been used successfully in other right management systems. For example,
the Linux kernel has a system to track whether independently loadable modules (like device drivers)
are GPL compatible or not [10].
Embedded and external control sets are more adaptive to the needs of the user. In an embedded control
set, the DRM enabled work comes with the control set embedded into the work. This can be done
by encapsulating the control set and the work in a security envelope [22]. In an external control set,
the DRM enabled work and the control sets arrive separately. The obvious advantage of a system of
this nature is that a single control set can be used to define rights for multiple works of the same type.
On the other hand, external control sets are usually held on a network server and are required to be
accessed each time a DRM work is accessed [23], allowing for strong right holder control. Both of
these systems can be further combined with a fixed control set. Many of the current DRM systems
use one of these two systems; the Apple iTunes Music Store for example uses an embedded control
set (Apple Fairplay) on the music combined with a basic fixed control set in the iTunes music player.
On the other hand, Microsoft recommends the use of a combination of embedded and external control
set system for distributing music and movies with the DRM enabled Windows Media Player 9 and
WMA and WMV media formats [19].
3.1.3 Distribution process
The third and final level of distinction is in the distribution process. Park et al. differentiated between
message push and external repository [22]. In a message push system, the data is transfered between
the sender and recipient by a direct communication channel such as e-mail. In an external repository,
the recipient fetches the data from a central repository and there is no need for the recipient to store
the data locally. Both systems have their uses in DRM systems, and the choice of distribution system
does not necessarily impact on the security of the data. Message push systems are useful in enterprises
where the data is only meant to be available to specific employees. Message push also has a greater
flexibility in managing individual right permissions. External repositories are useful for a wider range
of deployment, where the prospective user is unknown, and can also be used in systems where the
user cannot store the data permanently onto their own systems. This type of DRM allows the right
holder a high degree of control in how the user accesses and uses the data.
3.1.4 Characteristics of the Security Architectures
Park et al. also looked at some of the characteristics of the security architectures described above. In
these characteristics, they did not take into account any restrictions imposed by other elements in a
DRM system such as the REL. Table 1 looks at some of the characteristics of the different distribution
systems. These characteristics are a combination of features and characteristics proposed by Park et
al. [22] and Mulligan et al. [21]. Some of the suggestions need to be finely balanced in a DRM system,
for example the ability to track usage and access is liked by right holders but invades user privacy.
Architectures not utilising a VM (NC1 and NC2) are not considered as they are not suitable for DRM
systems.
Characteristics FC1 FC2 EC1 EC2 XC1 XC2
Right Holder can control access and usage Y Y Y Y Y Y
Right Holder can change the access rights after distri-
bution
N N N Y Y Y
Right Holder can change the usage rights after distri-
bution
N N N N Y Y
Provides persistent protection Y Y Y Y Y Y
Virtual Machine is vulnerable to attack Y Y Y Y Y Y
Allows right holder to track usage and access N Y N Y Y Y
Allows for re-use of the digital container3 N N N N Y Y
Users are allowed to access DRM protected data of-
fline
Y N Y N N N
Users can access data from any location or machine
(without carrying the data themselves)
N Y N Y N Y
Architecture allows for transfer of rights without third
parties
N N N N Y Y
Architecture allows for transfer of rights through a
trusted third party
N N Y Y Y Y
Table 1: Characteristics of DRM Distribution Architectures
3The user is allowed to distribute the DRM protected data him/her-self and the other users are allowed to access the
data after getting their own licenses
Figure 3: Using DRM enabled works [23]
3.2 Using DRM Enabled Works
In section 2.1, we described the different players in a DRM system as discussed by Bartolini et al.
The players described could fall into three categories - the right holders and authors, the distributors
and trusted third parties. We also suggested the addition of a new player - the user, which was left
out by Bartolini et al. The DRM security architectures (figure 2) describe how the content can be
communicated from the right holder (and/or authors) to the user.
Figure 3 shows how Rosenblatt [23] and Erickson [15] describe the usage of DRM enabled works in
most of the current systems. Current systems usually use a combination of embedded and external
rights control (i.e. the XC1, XC2, EC1 and EC2 distribution architectures described by Park et al.)
and make use of a license server that creates a license to access the work based on the rights. First
the content is packaged with a set of rights and distributed to the user. When the user requests the use
of the protected work, the DRM controller validates the rights and issues a license to use the work
depending on the rights. The application is then able to access the DRM protected work in accordance
to the rules set out by the license. Identity control is achieved by using an identity register that can
uniquely identify the client and different DRM solutions use different techniques to achieve this.
3.3 Types of DRM Controllers
The DRM controller in Rosenblatt and Erickson’s models are equivalent to the VM proposed by Park
et al, with a subtle difference. Park et al. defined the virtual machine as “software that runs on top
of vulnerable computing environment” [22]. Rosenblatt however argues that DRM controllers can be
placed at the hardware level (e.g. enhancing the BIOS of a desktop PC) or as an operating system
module in addition to being a VM for a specific application [23].
Most current DRM systems, like Apple iTunes, use software virtual machines for DRM controllers.
Application level DRM controllers have the advantage of having the capability of tailoring the DRM
to suit the needs of the application. However there are two key disadvantages to application level
DRM controls. Firstly, application level DRM control is hard to generalise, and this has led to the
development of multiple incompatible solutions for the same application [23]. Furthermore, the de-
velopment of DRM control becomes harder as each application has different designs and frameworks
which need to be controlled. The second disadvantage is that application level DRM cannot guarantee
right control of the protected work from operating system commands like “Print Screen” or the copy
shortcut “Control C”.
Microsoft Right Management Services (RMS) is the best example of an operating systems level DRM
system. A RMS system comprises of three parts: the client side DRM controller, the software devel-
opment kit to develop DRM enabled applications and a server module (for Windows 2003 Server) for
administering DRM enabled works. The RMS client module enforces rights requested by RMS en-
abled applications and is available for all Microsoft Windows 98SE and later versions of Microsoft’s
operating systems. Applications are developed using the RMS SDK which allows the developers
to handle rights associated with the works. Because RMS is an operating systems based module,
the right management is more wholistic and can prevent system commands like “print screen” from
executing. However RMS is not yet a complete solution, and is targeted only as an intra-enterprise
solution.
Rosenblatt believes that hardware level DRM controllers are the long term solution [23]. However
hardware level DRM controllers do not have a good reputation and the copy control mechanism in
DVD is the prime example. However the main failure of DVD-CSS was the use of a flawed encryption
algorithm and that the hardware control could not be upgraded by using a firmware [21]. Rosenblatt
believes that overcoming these problems is easy and once the full specifications of a hardware DRM
control mechanism is standardised, it will be only a matter of time before it is implemented.
3.4 Right Expression Languages
Right expression languages (RELs) are used to define the rights and conditions for a DRM en-
abled work that the right holder gives to the user. RELs are usually modelled on access control
languages [20], and usually take the form of:
has the to do
USER -----------------> RIGHT -----------------> ACTION
on the object being protected. This can be further enhanced by including parameters that restrict (or
maybe enhance) the right. The most common parameter is “time” which can be used to make the
right expire automatically. In the XrML 2.0 specifications [2] the requirements for a REL are given
as:
• Comprehensive: A language that shall be capable of expressing simple and complex rights in
any stage in a workflow, lifecycle or business model.
• Generic: A language shall be capable of describing rights for any type of digital content or
service (an ebook, a file system, a video or a piece of software)
• Precise: a language shall communicate precise meaning to all players in the system.
One of the most common RELs is eXtended Rights Markup Language (XrML). which was developed
originally at Xerox Parc labs and is now developed jointly by Microsoft and Xerox. XrML is an XML
based REL, and its syntax is specified by XML while its grammar is defined by XML schema defini-
tions [2]. The XrML 2.0 specifications are split into three parts: a core schema, a standard extension
schema to handle definitions that are broadly applicable but not a core feature, and a content specific
extension schema to handle concepts specific to the type of digital content.
In an XrML license, the issuer grants a set of principals a set of rights, under certain conditions,
over a set of resources. While the resources are usually digital files, XrML not only provides mecha-
nisms to include non digital objects such as a “a computer terminal” but also services and transactions.
XrML is used in all Microsoft DRM solutions including RMS as well as being the base of other
RELs. However, there have been many critisicms of current REL implementations for not being
able to handle all the legal requirements when enforcing copyright [20, 16]. Mulligan et al. argues
that RELs like XrML cannot be considered comprehensive until users are able to request additional
rights [20]. They argue that this ability is crucial for the enabling of fair use. Bechtold however argues
that many of the XrML rules and definitions like rights transfers are not implemented in current DRM
systems [9] and thus the failure of DRM systems to have fair use is not hampered by the language.
Bechtold maintains that a suite of programs that can implement all the rules and definitions available
in XrML will be able to achieve most of the requirements of DRM systems with less compromise
from right holders [9]. This would require users to communicate with the right holder to request
additional rights or changes in rights, as argued by Mulligan et al.
3.5 Protection, Management and Tracking
The broader definition of DRM systems include tools that enable the right holder to manage and track
the protected work. Protection itself can come in various forms. Most DRM enabled media come in
a secure envelope consisting of the encrypted work and its signature. Multimedia vendors are also
looking at embedding watermarks to identify the right holders of the digital work [12]. New tech-
niques in fingerprinting enable identification for text and even database tables [26, 18].
Uzuner et al. proposes the usage of tracking mechanisms to completely replace DRM systems that
exist solely to enforce copyright (like online music distributions) [26]. In such a system, every time a
copy of the copyrighted work is distributed, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) can keep record of the
transaction and then the users can be charged at the end of the month. However, such a system has
three key flaws. Firstly, this system will create a logistical nightmare for ISPs and it will also require
every ISP to implement such a tracking system. Secondly, users sitting behind firewalls and proxies
will only get a consolidated bill and additional detectors will be required to detect the actual users of
the work. And finally, if the users distribute works via secure encrypted channels, it is highly unlikely
that the content of the channel will be divulged and analysed.
4 CURRENT DRM SYSTEMS
In this section we compare 3 types of popular DRM systems. The first system is the 99 cent mu-
sic store as characterised by Apple iTunes. Of all the DRM systems, the Apple iTunes Music Store
has been the most successful commercially and is currently the dominant player in the online music
stores. The second system is the DRM system of the subscription music stores like Real’s Rhapsody,
while the third system is Microsoft’s Rights Management Service. For a technical report providing
further elaboration on these systems, the reader is referred to [7].
In section 2.5 we looked at the legal requirements for DRM systems, while in section 3.1.4 we looked
at the characteristics of the distribution architectures. In table 2 R01 – R04 are the legal rights that
users are granted by current fair law standards, while R05 – R08 represents the legal rights for the
right holders. C01 – C11 represents the characteristics of the DRM systems and are the same charac-
teristics discussed in section 3.1.4.
The following points discuss some of the characteristics of the systems in more detail:
• R01: Except for allowing for excerption from the audio files and the ability to transfer owner-
ship, the music stores allow for almost all other fair uses. RMS allows for the same range of
freedoms but subscription music stores are currently unable to offer most fair use scenarios.
• R02: RMS logs all user activity and currently there is no mechanism to stop monitoring of user
activity. Similarly, subscription music stores monitor usage, and Mulligan et al. contends that
Characteristics / Requirements 99c Stores Subscription
Stores
RMS
R01 Can handle most fair use scenarios Y N Y
R02 Promotes user privacy, and does not monitor usage of
DRM data
Y N N
R03 Allows for the transfer of rights N N N
R04 Allows for flexibility in rights implementations N N Y
R05 Can keep track of / detect illegal use of DRM enabled
media
N Y Y
R06 Can correctly collect revenue from the usage of works Y Y n/a
R07 Creates a secure distribution channel Y Y Y
R08 Prevents the illegal use of protected works Y Y Y
C01 Right holders control access and usage Y Y Y
C02 Right holders can change the access rights after dis-
tribution
N Y Y
C03 Right holders can change the usage rights after distri-
bution
N N N
C04 Provides persistent protection Y Y Y
C05 Virtual machine is vulnerable to attack Y Y Y
C06 Allows right holder to track usage and access N Y Y
C07 Allows for re-use of the digital container N N N
C08 Users are allowed to access DRM protected data of-
fline
Y N limited
C09 Users can access data from any location or machine
(without carrying the data themselves)
N Y Y
C10 DRM system allows for the transfer of rights N N N
C11 DRM system allows for the transfer of rights through
a trusted third party
possible N possible
Table 2: Comparisons of different DRM systems
some go further and actually have the ability to monitor other user activities like web browsing
habits [21].
• R04: Although none of the systems have feedback mechanisms, RMS is the only system that
allows a wide variety in rights configurations.
• R05: Because the 99c music stores have no tracking mechanisms, they cannot detect the illegal
usage of their media.
• C02: In RMS, the right holder can invalidate the user’s license and thus can change the access
rights after distribution. Similarly subscription music stores can deregister a user and the user
will no longer be able to listen to the music he/she downloaded.
• C03: RMS does allow the invalidation of use licenses, but cannot remotely change the license
conditions.
• C05: There is no known VM vulnerability in any of the DRM systems discussed, but there is
no guarantee that they are invulnerable.
• C06: The 99c Music stores do not use any logging or tracking mechanisms.
• C07: Because of this characteristic, none of the systems allow for transfer of ownership.
• C08: RMS needs at least one connection to get a use license. Subscription music stores do not
allow offline access.
• C09: Assumes that the machine itself is a trusted entity, or that the user can register the machine
as a trusted entity.
• C11: PlayFair4 allows the DRM to be stripped away from an iTunes Store file. Therefore it can
be employed in reverse to re-encrypt the file with the key for a different user, thus creating a
rights transfer. In RMS, the administrator can invalidate the user’s license, and can change the
rights of the file.
5 CONCLUSIONS
This paper gave a broad overview on what constitutes a DRM system, looking at both the legal and
technical requirements. Technically, it is very difficult to implement fair use as required by copyright
legislation and none of the current DRM systems implement all the fair use requirements. However,
systems such as Fairplay used in Apple’s iTunes Music Store, have managed to strike quite a good
balance between users’ expectations and providing sufficient protection to right holders.
Microsoft’s RMS has the potential to become the standard for enforcing rights management; it pro-
vides flexibility in allowing for both weak DRM control as needed for consumer services and for
strong DRM control as required for protecting enterprise documents. RMS also has the potential for
use in enforcing shrink-wrap licenses and a general mechanism in enforcing digital contracts. How-
ever, much of these applications cannot be enforced unless RMS creates a new mechanism for user
authentication, since the current mechanisms are either too restrictive or have too many security prob-
lems.
One of the key challenges in rights management remains the ability to transfer rights between two
parties. Although XrML supports the right to transfer, there are no mechanisms to do so. XrML also
lacks the ability to allow for bi-directional communication where the user asks the right holder for a
right. This ability is required if fair use is to be properly implemented.
Rights management technologies are here to stay and future systems will need to include DRM sys-
tems to either meet legislative requirements or to satisfy publishers’ and consumers’ demands. The
RMS platform is the first step in such a direction but open standards are required to enable protection
seamlessly across different operating systems and devices.
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4For more information on PlayFair the reader is directed to the discussions on Slashdot [6].
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